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Abstract
An oft-heard concern about the sustainability of the welfare state is that generous social welfare provi-
sions serve as an important pull factor in immigrants’ consideration of their preferred country of des-
tination. With their accumulated social risks, immigrants are averagely more likely to claim welfare
benefits, suggesting that generous provisions reinforce migration flows, and that migrants benefit
more from welfare than they contribute to it. Yet, little is known about what immigrants actually think
about government support to ensure a reasonable standard of living. To study immigrants’ ideas
about the welfare state, we analyse the 2008 ‘Welfare Attitudes’ module of the European Social
Survey. Our analysis shows that, although immigrants have somewhat stronger pro-welfare opinions
than non-immigrants, these are largely explained by their more disadvantaged position in society and
their more depressed opinions of the social malaise taking place in their receptive society.
Furthermore, much to our surprise, we find that immigrants’ views on welfare closely follow those of
the non-migrant population of the country they are living in, suggesting strong social integration at
the opinion level.
Introduction
Current economic recession has deteriorated immi-
grants’ employment opportunities even further, with un-
employment rates raised by 5% between 2008 and 2012
compared with a 3% increase among natives (OECD,
2013). This trend makes immigrants proportionally
more likely to claim welfare (Boeri, Hanson and
McCormik, 2002), causing growing concern about the
tense relationship between immigration and the welfare
state. The idea that generous welfare provision attracts
immigrants—‘welfare magnetism’ (Borjas, 1999)—also
exists among public opinion, as Europeans en masse
think that immigration is a strain for the welfare state
(Wright and Reeskens, 2013). In addition, of all social
risks (including old age and being unemployed), being
an immigrant is perceived as a least justified reason for
welfare deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006).
Europeans generally require immigrants to have worked
and paid taxes for a longer period before being entitled
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to welfare (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012).
Combined, majority Europeans’ idea of immigrants is
one of eager welfare claimants who benefit more than
they contribute (van der Waal, De Koster and van
Oorschot, 2013).
In sharp contrast with the vox populi that immi-
grants have an opportunistic relationship with the wel-
fare state, hardly any empirical studies exist that
undergird a specific eagerness of immigrants to ask for
more welfare provision compared to native residents
[see Dancygier and Saunders (2006) and Luttmer and
Singhal (2011) for exceptions]. Two general assump-
tions will guide our study. First, we claim that if immi-
grants make a strong appeal than natives for
redistribution, this is largely caused by possible differ-
ences in their socioeconomic position, ideological be-
liefs, and welfare relevant social perceptions. The
second assumption is that, relying on social integration
theory (van Tubergen, 2007), immigrants’ welfare pref-
erences gradually resemble those of natives. To evaluate
this proposition, we study differences between natives
and first- and second-generation immigrants in levels
and in the roots of welfare preferences. We further test if
immigrants’ welfare ideas are an imprint of dominant
ideas about the role of government (hereafter: RoG)
among the native population.
To study immigrants’ preferred RoG, we analyse the
‘Welfare Attitudes’ module of the 2008 European Social
Survey (ESS). Although the ESS has not oversampled
minorities, it allows for distinguishing native respond-
ents from first- and second-generation immigrants;
among immigrants, we can further trace their country of
origin, distinguish citizens from non-citizens, and know
the length of residence of the first generation.
Literature Review
Immigrants and the Welfare State
Immigrants’ relationship with the welfare state is often
portrayed as imbalanced. Economic ‘push-pull’ models
(Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Castles and Miller,
2003), which describe migration as a rational consider-
ation of the costs of leaving the origin country (push)
with the potential benefits that can be obtained in the
destination country (pull), have considered welfare pro-
vision as an important factor in immigrants’ decision for
a preferred host society (Borjas, 1989, 1999). This
econometric model would explain that equilibrium
is reached if a micro-level demand from vulnerable
immigrants to remedy their deprived condition is
being supplied by generous welfare programmes.
Contrasting American evidence (Borjas, 1999), ‘welfare
magnetism’ seems to be minimal in Europe, as migration
flows to Europe respond to opportunities on the labour
market more than to social safety net provision (Hooghe
et al., 2008; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009). Despite
these macro-level studies refuting welfare magnetism in
a European context, the idea that welfare provisions
bias migration flows is rather persistent (Kvist, 2004).
Welfare provision is not only believed to distort mi-
gration flows, but also immigrants’ host-society incorp-
oration. Koopmans (2010) recently argued that in
generous welfare states, the ‘warm handshake’ of low
economic penalties for non-activity hinders immigrants’
initiative for integration (see also Nannestad, 2007).
The claim is that in less developed welfare states with
stronger demands asked from immigrants to invest in
their employability, for instance by means of training
and language acquisition, activity rates of immigrants
would be higher. Koopmans (2010, p. 21) finds empir-
ical support for his argument in The Netherlands,
Sweden, and Belgium—all generous welfare states1—as
‘immigrants were able to survive on welfare support
without making such [linguistic and cultural skills]
adjustments’.
Yet, ideas about distorted migration flows and immi-
grants’ problematic host country incorporation caused
by generous welfare support implicitly depart from the
assumption that net of their more vulnerable socioeco-
nomic position, immigrants strongly favour welfare pro-
vision, maybe even more than natives do. Empirical
evidence of what immigrants actually think about the
RoG in ensuring a reasonable standard of living is, how-
ever, scarce. Most studies on opinions towards welfare
redistribution distinguishing between immigrants and
non-immigrants often limit foreign origin as a control
variable (Wright and Reeskens, 2013). The few studies
so far nonetheless suggest that immigrants are more in
favour of welfare than natives (Dancygier and Saunders,
2006; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
Self-Interest, Ideas, and Perceptions
Why should one expect that immigrants, as a social
group, have stronger RoG preferences? Students of wel-
fare legitimacy argue that support for welfare pro-
grammes rests on three explanations: self-interest,
political ideology, and deservingness perceptions
(Blekesaune and Quadango, 2003).
According to the self-interest proposition, people
who benefit from welfare redistribution are more likely
to support it (Kangas, 1997; Svallfors, 2004).
Immigrants’ and their descendants’ socioeconomic out-
comes are, as studies show, rather negative (OECD,
2013): they are more likely to have lower levels of
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education, be unemployed, and report lower income lev-
els than natives (Heath et al., 2008). Given their more
deprived position, the finding that immigrants rely rela-
tively more on welfare provisions than the native popu-
lation (Boeri, Hanson and McCormik, 2002; Muenz
and Fassmann, 2004) is not surprising. This leads to the
hypothesis that immigrants’ stronger demand for state
intervention is mediated by their more vulnerable socio-
economic position.
A second mechanism concerns symbolic politics
(Sears, Hensler and Speer, 1979; Sears et al., 1980; Jaeger
2006, 2008), stating that policy preferences—including
redistributive preferences—are determined by values and
norms socialized in pre-adulthood (Sears et al., 1980),
such as political ideology (Jaeger, 2008). This causal
model predicts that conservative people at the right of
this political spectrum—generally propagating individual
freedom and favouring laissez-faire politics—would be
less convinced of redistribution, contrary to liberal left
individuals who, having a clearer eye for equality and
intervention to achieve it, prefer redistribution more.
Although studies are limited, evidence shows that left-
wing parties accommodate more to claims made by
minorities, making immigrants more likely to vote for
these parties (Dancygier and Saunders, 2006).
Consequently, we propose that immigrants’ stronger RoG
preferences are mediated by their leftist political ideas.
Our third hypothesis predicts that stronger welfare
preferences depend on people’s perceptions about the
deservingness of vulnerable social groups (van
Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012). It has been
shown that a higher demand from government is ex-
pressed among those who perceive the living conditions
of the poor and other welfare target groups as worse, as
well as among people who have a more pessimistic out-
look on the economic situation of their country (van
Oorschot, 2006; Roosma, Gelissen and Van Oorschot,
2012). Although it is not self-evident whether immi-
grants would have deservingness opinions that make
them more pro-welfare, than natives—we leave this up
for empirical testing—we nonetheless propose that im-
migrants’ stronger interventionist preferences are medi-
ated by their stronger deservingness perceptions.
Social Integration and Acculturation
When political economists assume that immigrants’ de-
cision to migrate to European societies is driven by
strong welfare preferences, the question is what one as-
sumes specifically: that all migrants have high levels of
such preference regardless of the destination country, or
that immigrants have somewhat higher preferences than
the natives of the country they are now living in? As
hardly any study compared immigrants’ responses to
RoG preferences with natives’ demand (for an excep-
tion, see Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), we borrow in-
sights from related studies.
Social integration theory (Durkheim, 1951) would
suggest a plausible relationship between immigrants’
and natives’ preferences for welfare. As van Tubergen
argues (2007, p. 748), ‘people who are strongly inte-
grated into a social group are assumed to be more likely
to comply with the norms of that group’. To the extent
that the society an immigrant joins expresses particular
ideas about the RoG, immigrants are likely to follow
suit (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Maxwell, 2010;
Reeskens and Wright, 2014). To test this theoretical as-
sumption in more detail, we suggest a few hypotheses
and corresponding research strategies.
In a straightforward manner, this theory suggests
first of all overlap between natives’ and immigrants’
RoG preferences (Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010), implying
that in countries where natives exhibit higher demand
for welfare intervention, immigrants should do so as
well; alternatively, in a context of natives’ skepticism to-
wards government, we should expect immigrants to be
less in favour of intervention.
Second, social integration theory further implies a
temporal dimension, too. On the one hand, the expect-
ation is that those who have enjoyed full socialization
into their receptive society—second-generation immi-
grants—will resemble the natives of their host society
more. Consequently, larger gaps in the preferred RoG
are expected between natives and first-generation immi-
grants. On the second hand, for those immigrants born
outside the country—the first generation—social inte-
gration theory would suggest that those immigrants who
have resided longer in the host society will resemble
more the natives’ levels of support. Further, apart from
studying differences in RoG preferences between natives
and immigrants, a different strategy suggests investigat-
ing whether these preferences are explained by the same
set of factors equally for immigrants and natives
(Reeskens and Wright, 2014). In line with the idea of
the ‘welfare magnet’, it may be expected that recently
arrived immigrants as a group more strongly favour wel-
fare redistribution—which implies that differentiation
among these immigrants would be low. But the more
immigrants reside in the country, it should be expected
that their opinion on redistributive social policies is an
expression of the structural and social position they
hold, and their perceptions on society.
Third, next to this more sociological approach to
‘acculturation’, the legal transition into citizenship
might affect individual opinions, too (Prokic-Breuer
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et al., 2012). As redistribution regards the allocation of
‘goods’ and ‘bads’ in society, legal citizenship status—
which brings about rights as much as obligations—
creates a strong concern about the correct allocation of
scarce welfare resources. Citizens ought to have a stron-
ger stake in the welfare state than non-citizens. An add-
itional explanation is that immigrants’ access to welfare
is restricted, demarcated either by length of residence or
citizenship, which in any case predicts stronger demands
for intervention from non-citizens.
Fourth, the explanations so far neglect immigrants’
partial or full socialization in a foreign context. Related
evidence proposes that first-generation immigrants’ polit-
ical and social values are often an imprint of their origin
country (Dinesen, 2013); second-generation immigrants,
on the other hand, have received socialization by parents
or grandparents who lived in a country different from
their current host society (Uslaner, 2008). A recent study
limited to European immigrants only—without exploring
the rich heterogeneity in immigrant composition across
Europe—showed that immigrants’ welfare preferences
are culturally determined and reflect their country of ori-
gin (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011). Our study therefore
fully explores whether immigrants from poorer periph-
eral countries make stronger appeal to welfare redistribu-
tion than immigrant originating from wealthier societies,
as push-pull models predict (Borjas, 1999).
Data and Methods
Sample
In this study, we analyse the ESS 2008, for which repre-
sentative samples of >20 countries were questioned on a
number of political and social issues. Particular for the
2008 wave is its extensive welfare attitudes battery.
Because the ESS aims at being representative for the
total population, it has not oversampled immigrants,
causing us to drop countries with <20 respondents per
immigrant category, as it would lead to imprecise esti-
mates. We also limit the number of countries to EU or
OECD member states, leaving us with 30,475 respond-
ents for 18 countries.2 Further, because the ESS is fielded
in languages spoken by >5 per cent of the population, it
only includes the best integrated immigrants.3
Limitations of this sampling design is discussed through-
out, yet, we can rely on previous studies on migrant in-
corporation analysing representative social surveys in a
similar manner (Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Maxwell,
2010; de Rooij, 2012; Reeskens and Wright, 2014).
Because the ESS has not oversampled minority re-
spondents, we briefly review our sample, distinguishing
between native residents (those born in the country with
domestic parents), second-generation immigrants (those
born in the country but at least one parent of foreign ori-
gin), and first-generation immigrants (born abroad). As
a reference, we include the proportion of foreign-born
residents in each country for 2008, estimated via lin-
ear interpolation of UN 2005 and 2010 statistics. As
Table 1 shows, an almost perfect correlation (q¼ .92)
exists between the proportion of first-generation immi-
grants in the ESS and the UN foreign-born estimates. To
further evaluate the validity of the ESS immigrant sam-
ple, immigrants’ country of origin and their parents’
country of origin are recoded into meaningful regional
clusters. Descriptives (Supplementary Table A1) suggest
that the representation of the origin regions largely re-
flects immigration histories of the studied host countries
(cf. Castles and Miller, 2003).
Dependent Variable
Welfare preferences are measured with a latent scale
composed of six items (Cronbach’s a¼ 0.83) measuring
the opinion to which one thinks it is the responsibility of
the government to ensure (i) jobs for everyone who
wants one, (ii) adequate health care for the sick, (iii) a
reasonable standard of living for the old, (iv) a
Table 1. Distribution of natives, second-generation immi-
grants and first-generation immigrants in the European
Social Survey, and the UN share of immigrants’ data
estimates
Country Natives Second
generation
First
generation
UN
estimate
N Pct N Pct N Pct
CH 1,113 68.0 142 8.7 382 23.3 22.84
IE 1,368 82.2 30 1.8 266 16.0 18.64
LV 1,238 74.6 170 10.2 251 15.1 15.64
EE 890 67.2 167 12.6 267 20.2 14.16
SE 1,408 82.9 91 5.4 199 11.7 13.38
DE 2,200 87.2 110 4.4 214 8.5 13.02
FR 1,611 84.6 136 7.1 158 8.3 10.66
ESS average 26,111 85.7 1,493 4.9 2,871 9.4 10.64
NL 1,439 86.7 66 4.0 154 9.3 10.54
GB 1,838 86.9 81 3.8 197 9.3 10.12
GR 1,766 91.5 53 2.7 114 5.9 9.58
NO 1,317 89.3 37 2.5 120 8.0 9.20
BE 1,349 82.8 120 7.3 160 9.8 8.86
DK 1,347 91.1 47 3.2 85 5.7 8.40
SI 933 85.1 70 6.4 94 8.6 8.22
PT 1,785 93.1 26 1.4 107 5.6 8.04
CZ 1,664 94.1 73 4.1 32 1.8 4.40
HU 1,375 96.0 27 1.9 30 2.1 3.54
SK 1,470 94.4 47 3.0 41 2.6 2.36
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reasonable standard of living for the unemployed, (v)
sufficient childcare services for working parents, and (vi)
paid leave from work for people who have to take care
of sick family members is provided. Each item is offered
with an 11-point response scale ranging from ‘it should
not be governments’ responsibility at all’ (0) to ‘it should
be entirely governments’ responsibility’ (10). This latent
‘preferred Role of Government’ (hereafter ‘RoG’) scale4
has been shown to constitute the core of welfare legitim-
acy (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012) and passes
conventionally cross-national measurement equivalence
tests (Roosma, Gelissen and Van Oorschot, 2012).
Independent Variables
Our individual-level predictors (see Supplementary
Tables A2 and A3 for descriptives) of self-interest regard
first of all educational levels, measured by the harmon-
ized International Standard Classification of Education
scale ranging from ‘less than lower secondary education’
(1) to ‘tertiary education completed’ (5). Work status is
categorized by being employed (reference), being un-
employed, being a student, being retired, and being in
another status. Unemployed experiences are captured by
a dummy whether or not (reference) one has been un-
employed for longer than 3 months. Income is measured
using a harmonized 10-point scale. In final, we also in-
clude whether or not (reference) the respondent’s main
source of income is welfare benefits.5
Political ideas are measured by the traditional
left–right self-placement scale. For perceptions, we first
consider ‘perceived welfare burden’, referring to re-
spondents’ estimates of the omnipresence of various so-
cial problems. This measure is a latent scale (Cronbach’s
a¼ 0.77) of items asking of every 100 people of working
age, how many (i) are unemployed and looking for a
job, (ii) are long-term sick or disabled, and (iii) do not
have enough money for basic necessities. The scale runs
from 1 (‘0–4’) to 11 (‘50 or more’). Last, perceptions of
the poor living conditions of risk groups are measured
by a latent scale (Cronbach’s a¼0.65) comprising the
items what one thinks of the living conditions of the
pensioners and the unemployed. Response scales range
from extremely good (‘0’) to extremely bad (‘10’).
As for characteristics unique for immigrants, we dis-
tinguish between citizens and non-citizens (reference).
For first-generation immigrants (born abroad), we in-
clude length of residence, which asked the respondent
‘How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?’,
ranging from ‘within last year’ (‘1’) to ‘more than 20
years ago’ (‘5’). Immigrants’ (or their parents’) region of
origin is also included, distinguishing between (i)
Western European origin (reference); (ii) Eastern
European origin; (iii) Russia or Caucasian countries; (iv)
African countries; (v) Asian countries; (vi) Middle
Eastern countries; (vii) North American countries; (viii)
South American countries, including Central American
countries; (ix) Oceania; and (x) no information
available.
We control for age, ranging from 16 to 99, with the
expectation that elderly respondents are more pro-wel-
fare (Inglehart, 1990). We also include gender, with the
expectation that women support redistribution more
than men (reference) (d’Anjou, Steijn and Van Aarsen,
1995).
To cope with considerable non-response on income
(23 per cent) and political ideology (11 per cent), mul-
tiple imputation is applied (Rubin, 1987). As advised by
Graham, Olchowski and Gilreath (2007), we imputed
40 data sets in which the missing values are replaced by
different imputations that reflect uncertainty in the miss-
ing data. The used imputation model is linear regression,
including all variables of our individual-level analysis.6
Analytical Strategy
First, at the bivariate level, we evaluate to what extent
first- and second-generation immigrants differ from na-
tives in their preferred RoG. Second, we evaluate
whether such differences can be explained by differences
between immigrants and natives in their socioeconomic
status, political ideas, and related perceptions. Third, we
assess whether opinions towards welfare redistribution
are structured by the same set of theoretically relevant
covariates, equally for immigrants and natives. Fourth,
we explore the role of immigrant-specific explanations
such as country-of-origin effects. Fifth and final, we esti-
mate how alike immigrants’ opinions are to the support
levels of natives of the country they migrated to.
We perform multilevel regression analysis using
SPSS’ MIXED maximum likelihood procedure (Gelman
and Hill, 2006; Hox, 2010), to account for the clustered
nature of the ESS—individuals within countries. The ro-
bustness of the individual-level models is confirmed
using fixed-effects models (Alison, 2009). In our ana-
lysis, we pay further attention to the r-squared values
for both natives and immigrants, to untangle whether
opinions are more structured among natives than
among immigrants. To calculate the r-squared values at
the individual and country levels, we make use of the
formulas showing the proportional reduction in variance
(Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Additional reported model
fit indices include the 2loglikelihood and the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) coefficient (Gelman and
Hill, 2006).
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Results
Exploring Differences between Natives and
Immigrants
An exploratory analysis of variance test (5.32; df¼2;
P<0.01) on the pooled data reveals a weak but signifi-
cant difference between natives (7.55; SD¼1.54) and
first-generation immigrants (7.64; SD¼ 1.57) in their
preferred RoG, whereas there is no difference between
natives and second-generation immigrants (7.63;
SD¼1.56). First-generation immigrants—without full
socialization in their host society—are thus more in de-
mand of state intervention.
These single-level descriptives are amplified when
taking the nested data structure into account (Model 1
of Table 2). The bivariate analysis shows that second-
generation immigrants prefer a slightly stronger RoG
compared with native residents (b¼0.11; SE¼0.038).
There are larger discrepancies between first-generation
immigrants and native respondents, as first-generation
immigrants are almost 0.2 scale points more in support
of redistribution (b¼ 0.18; SE¼0.029). Albeit statis-
tically significant, this difference can hardly be called
substantially significant.
In any case, the bivariate analysis shows that
there are small, yet meaningful differences between
natives and immigrants in their preferred RoG,
because the analysis hints about the applicability of
social integration theory on explaining welfare opinions
among immigrants. Second-generation immigrants
resemble more the preferred levels of state intervention
of the native population than first-generation immi-
grants do.
Table 2. Multilevel regression models explaining preferred role of government
Fixed effects Model 1: origin only Model 2: with controls
Parameter SE Parameter SE
Intercept 7.557*** 0.145 7.060*** 0.134
Immigrant status:
Second generation 0.111** 0.038 0.015 0.037
First generation 0.182*** 0.029 0.094*** 0.028
Ref: native
Levels of education 0.027*** 0.007
Work status
Unemployed 0.021 0.040
Student 0.124** 0.037
Retired 0.034 0.034
Other status 0.003 0.028
Ref: paid work
Unemployment experience 0.114*** 0.020
Income 0.029*** 0.004
On welfare benefit 0.011 0.029
Political left–right ideology 0.074*** 0.004
Welfare burden 0.075*** 0.004
Perceived living conditions 0.120*** 0.005
Women 0.102*** 0.016
Age 0.000 0.001
Random effects Parameter SE Parameter SE
Individual-level variance 2.026*** 0.016 1.882*** 0.015
Country-level variance 0.378** 0.130 0.254** 0.087
Individual r-squared 0.145% 7.201%
Country r-squared 0.000% 32.074%
2loglikelihood 108,107.950 105,958.944
BIC 108,128.599 105.979.593
N 30,475 30,475
*P<0.05; **P< 0.01; ***P< 0.001. Entries represent the results of two separate multilevel regression analyses.
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Explaining Differences between Natives and
Immigrants
Can immigrants’ slightly higher support for state inter-
vention be explained by differences in socioeconomic
positions, political beliefs, and social perceptions? As
Supplementary Tables A2 and A3 indicate, immigrants
are not less educated, but are on the other hand more
likely to be unemployed and have a higher likelihood of
having been unemployed for longer than 3 months.
Moreover, while there are no income differences be-
tween natives and second-generation immigrants, first-
generation immigrants’ incomes are significantly lower
than those of other residents. Further, descriptives indi-
cate that immigrants are slightly more leftist, have stron-
ger perceptions of the social malaise of society, and
perceive the living conditions of disadvantaged groups
as significantly worse compared with native
respondents.
Controlling for variables relevant for explaining wel-
fare attitudes, Model 2 of Table 2 shows that second-
generation immigrants do not differ significantly from
native respondents (b¼ 0.018; SE¼ 0.037), whereas the
first-generation effect is cut in half compared with the
bivariate effect presented in Model 1 of Table 2
(b¼ 0.094; SE¼ 0.028). Detailed stepwise regressions
(see Supplementary Table A4) indicate that immigrants’
slightly stronger preferences about the RoG can to a
large extent be explained by their higher likelihood to be
unemployed, their more leftist political views, and, in
particular, their more depressed views on the social state
of their host country, as well as on the living conditions
of their vulnerable fellow residents. These relevant inde-
pendent variables do, however, not completely cancel
out the gap in welfare opinions between first-generation
immigrants and native respondents.
Different Roots in Natives’ and Immigrants’
Preferred RoG?
In addition to the performed mediation analysis, a dif-
ferent way to respond to the question whether immi-
grants gradually resemble natives’ preferred RoG is to
detect whether immigrants’ opinions are structured by
the same set of variables as it does for natives.
Albeit not a strong statistical test, the presented
r-squared values of Tables 3 indicate that second-
generation immigrants’ opinions are more structured
than first-generation immigrants’ attitudes towards the
welfare state. Further eyeballing the determination
structures, it seems that self-interest predictors are par-
ticularly relevant among the native population: the
higher educated as well as those with unemployment
experiences and lower-income groups prefer a stronger
RoG. Interaction tests (Supplementary Tables A5 and
A6) show that the effects of education and those with an
unemployment experience are different for first-gener-
ation immigrants, i.e. higher-educated immigrants do
not have weaker RoG preferences than lower-educated
immigrants; further, first-generation immigrants with an
unemployment experience of at least 3 months have
weaker demands than natives with such an unemploy-
ment experience. Subsequently, second-generation
immigrants on benefit are less in demand of interven-
tionism than natives. Concerning self-interest explan-
ations, first-generation immigrants thus differ more
from natives than second-generation immigrants do;
additionally, if effects differ, the most vulnerable immi-
grants seem to, contrary to our expectations, demand
less from government than natives do.
Table 3 (and Supplementary Tables A5 and A6 for
interaction tests) shows that ideological dispositions and
social perceptions influence RoG perceptions among na-
tives and immigrants alike: immigrants at the right also
oppose interventionism than those at the left, similar as
natives do. Also, perceiving that society has many social
problems and perceiving risk groups in a poor living
condition translates in a higher demand for state inter-
vention to ensure a reasonable living condition.
Important to note is that political ideology and burden
perceptions largely absorb effects of self-interest, sug-
gesting that respondents in vulnerable positions lean to
the left and have stronger perceptions of the social mal-
aise of society.
In summary, at the individual level, we see that
whereas natives’ preferred RoG are well-structured, de-
viances can be found among first-generation immi-
grants. These findings corroborate the idea that
immigrants gradually acculturate to natives’ ideas about
welfare redistribution.
Immigrant-Specific Explanations for Welfare
Preferences
To further untangle whether acculturation of welfare
attitudes occurs, variation between immigrants is studied.
With regard to citizenship, we see our hypothesis that
citizens are less in favour of state intervention only
confirmed among second-generation immigrants.7
Contrasting our expectation, length of residence has a
positive effect on the demand for more state intervention.
A possible explanation is that at the point of entry, immi-
grants simply refrain from asking assistance but later
catch up to natives’ preferences, as they also contribute
more to their origin country albeit they might face un-
equal welfare access. This mechanism disqualifies the idea
that recently arrived immigrants would be rather
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opportunistic. Observing region-of-origin effects, then,
we see hardly any consistent patterns. Second-generation
Asian and Southern American immigrants ask for less
intervention than those originating from Western Europe;
among first-generation immigrants, we see that North
Americans have slightly weaker RoG preferences. In any
case, a general trend that immigrants from poorer regions
are more in demand of intervention cannot be found.
Summarized, a study of immigrant-specific character-
istics further refutes the idea that immigrants are in gen-
eral in an opportunistic relationship with the welfare
state. Citizens of foreign origin have more stakes in the
Table 3. Multilevel regression models explaining preferred role of government among European native borns and second-
and first-generation immigrants
Fixed effects Native born Second generation First generation
Parameter SE Parameter SE Parameter SE
Intercept 7.067*** 0.139 7.182*** 0.308 7.067*** 0.257
Levels of education 0.036*** 0.008 0.006 0.033 0.021 0.021
Work status
Unemployed 0.015 0.045 0.090 0.158 0.066 0.111
Student 0.135** 0.041 0.030 0.144 0.046 0.130
Retired 0.029 0.037 0.075 0.167 0.078 0.112
Other status 0.018 0.031 0.066 0.127 0.127 0.086
Ref: paid work
Unemployed experience 0.125*** 0.021 0.096 0.084 0.045 0.059
Income 0.030*** 0.004 0.008 0.017 0.023 0.013
On welfare benefit 0.002 0.031 0.236 0.129 0.033 0.090
Left–right ideology 0.073*** 0.004 0.084*** 0.018 0.076*** 0.013
Welfare burden 0.074*** 0.004 0.081*** 0.016 0.064*** 0.012
Perceived living conditions 0.125*** 0.006 0.103*** 0.023 0.077*** 0.016
Women 0.106*** 0.018 0.122 0.075 0.050 0.053
Age 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Citizen 0.303* 0.125 0.098 0.061
Length of residence 0.087** 0.033
Origin region
Eastern Europe 0.045 0.126 0.077 0.084
Russia/Caucasus 0.120 0.127 0.041 0.107
Africa 0.105 0.168 0.035 0.102
Asia 0.688* 0.280 0.218 0.196
Middle East 0.160 0.175 0.027 0.104
North America 0.419 0.267 0.346 0.185
South America 0.660 0.350 0.063 0.172
Oceania 0.480 0.811 0.144 0.327
Other 0.122 0.270 0.101 0.171
Ref: West Europe
Random effects Parameter SE Parameter SE Parameter SE
Individual-level variance 1.876*** 0.016 1.911*** 0.071 1.819*** 0.049
Country-level variance 0.264** 0.091 0.182* 0.075 0.314** 0.118
Individual r-squared 7.293% 6.438% 4.635%
Country r-squared 31.794% 45.016% 26.442%
2loglikelihood 90,702.921 5291.711 9,889.712
BIC 90,723.260 5306.295 9,905.598
N 26,111 1,493 2,871
P<0.10; *P< 0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001. Entries represent the results of three separate multilevel regression analyses.
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correct allocation of scarce resources, making them more
skeptical than non-citizens. In the absence of country-of-
origin effects, we have, however, no convincing evidence
for a strong cultural imprint of the immigrants.
Adaptation to the Host-Country Mainstream
So far, we have compared average differences between
natives and first- and second-generation immigrants,
leaving aside the question whether immigrants’ RoG
preferences reflect those of the natives of their adoptive
society. Social integration theory suggests a close associ-
ation between second-generation immigrants and native
respondents, while this overlap is somewhat weaker be-
tween first-generation immigrants and natives.
At the bivariate level, Figure 1 shows the association
between natives and second-generation immigrants, and
natives and first-generation immigrants, of their aggre-
gate RoG preferences. In case of a perfect overlap, all
countries should collapse with the solid line. The graphs
indicate a strong positive association between welfare
attitudes of the native population and the immigrants
residing in these countries, albeit a more perfect associ-
ation for the second generation (indicated by more vari-
ation in the first-generation graph). In other words, in
countries where the majority is less in demand of inter-
ventionism, immigrants will be more skeptical, too.
To verify that the overlap between immigrants and
natives in their opinions about welfare redistribution
does not reflect differences in immigrants’ group com-
position, a more formal test requires aggregating na-
tives’ preferences at the country level, and estimating
the effect of natives’ responses on first- and second-
generation immigrants’ opinion, controlling for individ-
ual-level respondent characteristics. Assuring that
immigrants’ opinion does not depend on the size of the
welfare state (see for instance van Oorschot and
Meuleman, 2012), we also control for social expend-
iture per capita, as obtained from Eurostat. Such a test
would also respond to the ‘welfare magnetism’ thesis
whether immigrants in more generous welfare states
make stronger demands. Bivariate graphs (Supplemen-
tary Figure A1) show that immigrants’ preferred RoG is
not determined by the size of the welfare state.
Table 4 indicates that immigrants’ preferred RoG
is a reflection of how strong majority residents’ pre-
ferred RoG actually is, and unrelated to the size of the
welfare state. Observing the r-squared values at the
country level, we further see that the explanatory
power of natives’ welfare opinions on immigrants’ at-
titudes is larger for second-generation than for first-
generation immigrants, confirming social integration
theory.
To be complete, a similar exercise has been done for
Western European and non-Western European immi-
grants. The results, found in Supplementary Figure A2
and Table A7, show that both groups of immigrants ac-
culturate to natives’ welfare preferences, yet, effects
seem to be stronger for Western European immigrants,
implying that the acculturation to the mainstream is
slightly more difficult among non-Western European
immigrants.
Conclusion
For welfare states to be sustainable, support given by
public opinion—claimants and contributors alike—is of
vital importance (Brooks and Manza, 2007). With an in-
crease in studies showing that Europeans perceive that
immigrants take out more of the welfare state than they
put in, the aim of this article was to evaluate whether
immigrant opinions about welfare redistribution are as
opportunistic as the vox populi hold. Our leading as-
sumptions were, on the one hand, that immigrants do
have stronger RoG preferences, but only because they
are socioeconomically more vulnerable, have more left-
ist political views, and have stronger deservingness view;
on the other hand, based on social integration theory
(Durkheim, 1951; van Tubergen, 2007), we proposed
that immigrants’ redistributive preferences accommo-
date to the context they live in.
An analysis of the 2008 ESS shows that whereas im-
migrants are significantly more in support for govern-
ment intervention, this demand is not substantially
higher. Further, this higher request is indeed largely ex-
plained by the fact that their objective socioeconomic
position is slightly worse compared with natives, but
also that their subjective interpretation of society in
ideas and perceptions is more depressed. Taking such
precarious socioeconomic conditions, left-wing ideolo-
gies, and corresponding negative opinions on society
into account, differences between second-generation and
native respondents disappear and are reduced among
first-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants
still have slightly more stronger RoG preferences that
cannot be completely explained by their structural and
cultural characteristics. Potentially, such stronger RoG
preferences are a response of higher barriers to welfare
state access.
Our study shows that immigrants’ opinions about
the welfare state acculturate to the mainstream. Not
only are there larger gaps with natives’ preferences for
first- than for second-generation immigrants, the latter
groups’ preferences are also more structured in conven-
tional explanations; less differentiation exists among
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first-generation immigrants. Yet, if immigrant character-
istics differ in how they affect welfare preferences, the
direction is that the most vulnerable immigrants are
slightly less in demand of interventionism than vulner-
able natives. Further, citizenship—with its accompany-
ing rights and obligations that alter stakes in welfare
allocation—makes immigrants less demanding of inter-
vention. Recently arrived immigrants are, moreover, less
in support of interventionism. Not unimportantly, we
found no evidence that immigrants from poorer regions
are overwhelmingly more in demand of a strong RoG.
These findings eventually alter the claim that newly
arrived immigrants enter with strong demands from the
welfare state.
We further found overwhelming evidence that
immigrants’ preferences for welfare state intervention
Figure 1. Relationship between aggregated RoG preferences among natives (X-axis) and immigrants (Y-axis).
Note: The solid diagonal indicates a theoretical perfect overlap between natives’ and immigrants’ responses to welfare redistribu-
tion. The dashed line represents the fitted line summarizing the association between natives’ and immigrants’ responses. Each dot
represents a country in the ESS.
10 European Sociological Review, 2015, Vol. 0, No. 0
 at K
U
 Leuven U
niversity Library on February 17, 2015
http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
largely follow majority opinions. Yet, such effects are
stronger for second-generation immigrants than for
first-generation immigrants; also Western European im-
migrants follow natives’ preferences easier than non-
Western European immigrants do. In societies where the
majority is less inclined to support government redistri-
bution, immigrants are also less strongly in demand of
interventionism. Acculturation seems to go easier for
Western European than for non-Western European immi-
grants. This finding of the acculturation of welfare atti-
tudes fits into related studies showing acculturation
effects of majority opinion on immigrant residents
(Reeskens and Wright, 2014; Dinesen and Hooghe,
2011). In any case, future detailed studies should untangle
how this acculturation works in practice.
In our assessment that immigrants do not have stron-
ger RoG preferences and that they gradually resemble
natives’ ideas, a few cautions are warranted. First, it
needs to be kept in mind that the analysed data were not
particularly collected for minority studies. Whereas
related research undergirds the neat use of this ESS, we
should be careful nonetheless for the fact that the ESS
has surveyed only the best integrated immigrants.
Although we do see in the immigrants’ origin a reflec-
tion of the host countries’ immigration history, we
also see that average educational levels of immigrants
are elevated from native respondents. Contrary, more
immigrants are without a job, and have encountered un-
employment experiences of at least 3 months. Studying
the best integrated immigrants might reflect in smaller
gaps with natives. Such gaps might thus be slightly
but according to our insights not alarmingly larger if
also less well-integrated respondents would be present.
In any case, immigrants themselves are a very heteroge-
neous group in which outspoken preferences for welfare
are not a given fact. This selection bias that might affect
individual-level outcomes is, however, less problematic
for the analysis between countries. Because every coun-
try will be equally affected by self-selection of the best
immigrants (yet, some systematic differences may exist,
e.g. the prevalence of undocumented immigration in cer-
tain countries), we are on firmer footing here for the re-
sults between countries than within countries.
Second, one might also claim that immigrants’ atti-
tudes towards the welfare state are not predictive for
their actual behaviour within society in general, and on
the labour market in particular. That is, in spite of the
finding that they are not more pro-welfare compared
with natives, critics might argue that this does not neces-
sarily implicate that immigrants do not want to enjoy
this safety net (cf. Koopmans, 2010). Theoretical mod-
els, such as the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen,
1991), would predict that actions require an appropriate
set of supporting attitudes, meaning that one might as-
sume that immigrants who are pro-welfare will in their
actions also show effort to perform well on the labour
market in order to not rely on welfare provision.
Nonetheless, the discrepancy between studies showing
alarming unemployment levels among immigrants in
more generous welfare states and our study that indi-
cates that immigrants demand not overwhelmingly more
state intervention in such countries requires more atten-
tion about the mechanisms behind such elevated un-
employment levels, as it might further indicate the
discriminatory barriers that prevent immigrants from
full participation in the labour market and society.
Notes
1 One liability of this study is that labour market par-
ticipation in the smallest welfare states of Southern
and Eastern Europe is not studied.
2 These countries are Belgium (BE), Czech Republic
(CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), France (FR),
Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU),
Ireland (IE), Latvia (LV), The Netherlands (NL),
Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK),
Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), and
the United Kingdom (GB).
3 As the descriptives in Supplementary Tables A2 and
A3 show, the sampled immigrants have, on average,
slightly higher educational qualifications, while
Table 4. Country-level effects on preferred role of govern-
ment among second- and first-generation immigrants
Fixed effects Second generation First generation
Parameter SE Parameter SE
Social expenditure
per capita
0.004 0.020 0.005 0.023
Natives’ preferred RoG 0.643*** 0.112 0.777*** 0.144
Random effects Parameter SE Parameter SE
Individual-level variance 1.910*** 0.071 1.819*** 0.049
Country-level variance 0.036 0.022 0.094* 0.040
Individual r-squared 6.601% 4.641%
Country r-squared 84.382% 76.869%
2loglikelihood 5,276.832 10,064.559
BIC 5,291.413 10,080.483
N 1,493 2,871
*P<0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001. Entries represent the results of two
separate multilevel regression models, controlled for the individual-level pre-
dictors of Table 3.
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they do not earn more than natives. They further
are more likely to be without a job or have been un-
employed for at least 3 months.
4 Because several studies on welfare attitudes focused
on the single survey question ‘The government
should take measures to reduce differences in in-
come levels’ (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), we also
analysed this item (not discussed owing to page limi-
tations). Results, which can be obtained from the au-
thors, are the same as those presented throughout.
5 Although a higher share of natives is on benefits, a
larger section of the native sample compared with
immigrants enjoys pension benefits.
6 To correct for differences across countries, country
dummies are used in the imputation model.
7 There is only a small proportion of non-citizens
among the second-generation sample; potentially,
this group might refrain from acquiring citizenship.
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